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STATE OF UTAH
-----oooOOOooo----DELBERT M. YERGENSEN 1
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Appellant~
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10196
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EMMETT D. FORD and N. E.
FERGUSON~ dba FORD AND
FERGUSON I
Defendants and Respondents.
-----oooOOOooo----BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an action to renew a judgment
against the defendants which the latter allege is outlawed by the Statute of Lirnitations.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The case was originally submitted by
Stipulation to the pre-trial judge for disposition.
Judgment finally resulted from plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment at which time a verdict and judg-

ment was granted to defendant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment
and judgment in his favor.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff obtained judgment on September
15., 1949., on three notes executed by the defendants.
On April 18., 1950 the defendants, in order to release
-2- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a lien on real estate entered into an acknowledgment
of and agreement to pay the obligation and did make
payment thereafter in the amount of $450.00 1 notations of said payments being made on the acknowledgment. (Tr. 4-6). This last payment was made on
October 10, 1950. On February 5 1 1958 an action
was filed to renew the original judgment which was
more than eight years after the judgment was obtained but less than eight years after the acknowledgment
and payment.

The defendant then raised the question

of the Statute of Limitations as a defense.
At Pre-trial on October 14., 1960 1 the
Court upon the stipulation of counsel agreed to decide
the issue forthwith but gave counsel for defendant
and respondent time to file a brief.

No less than

nine written requests and three personal visits were
made to the Court

IJ:# the defendants counsel in an

effort to get a decision.

Finally three years and
-3-
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eight months later the Court rendered a decision upon
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING AS
p_, MATTER OF LAW THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOUND IN 78-12-22 WAS TOLLED BY A
WRITTEN ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND PAYMENT ON
THE JUDG1V1ENT

r

The Utah Statute of Limitations relating to
judgments is Section 78-12-22, UCA 1953, which is
set out below.
''An action upon a judgment or decree of any
Court of the United States or of any state or territory

within the United States. "
Appellant admits that there is a split of
authority as to whether or not a judgment is taken
without the Statute of Limitations by an acknowledgment
and payment thereon.

However, it does submit that

its position is the strongest of the majority rule; strongest in that some jurisdictions allow the tolling with part
-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

payment, others with written acknowledgment.

In this

instance we find both a written acknowledgment and
substantial payments made over a period of five
months. Appellant further contends that the majority
opinion furthers the cause of justice and public policy
more than the minority view expressed by the respondent.
The tolling of the Statute of Limitations by
part payment and written acknowledgment was known
at common law as it evidenced by VoL, 34, Am. Jur.
Section 333, Page 262.
"The effect of part payment in taking a case
out of the operation of the Statute of Limitations or
in enlarging the time during which an action may be

brought, is not derived from statutory provisions but
results from the decision of the Courts.

Although no

provision was made either in the Act of James I or in
Lord Tenterden Pet with respect to the effects of part
-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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payment on the OfE ration of the Statute of Limitations, a judicial exception was engrafted thereon
at an early date, to the effect that a part payment of
a debt or obligation will take it out of the operation

of the statute, and in the absence of a statutory
modification or change this is the generally prevailing rule in this country. ''

It is therefore apparent that the absence
of any statute in the State of Utah specifically Qncompassing judgments within this doctrine of limitations
is not fatal to appellants position; that this rule prevailed at common law and prevails now in the majority of the States in the Union.

Not that it hasn 1t

been interpreted differently in various jurisdictions
as a result of statutes and judicial decisions, but
that the existence of this doctrine is justified in
all jurisdictions except those containing express
statutory enactments against it.
-6-
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Appellant cites the annotations in 45 A LR 2d
970 as containing representative decisions from the
different jurisdictions.

Two of the many directly in

point are cited below:
The California case of Wilson v. Walters
(1944) 66 Cal. App. 2d 1, 151 P. 2685 contained in

the ALR citation was an action to renew a judgment
and concerned a series of payments together with a
letter stating it was impossible to make payment
on the matter.

The Court held:

nit is a question of law as to whether an

acknowledgment in writing is sufficient to
toll the statute. " Sterling v. Title Insurance Co., 53 Cal. App. 2d 736, 740., 128 P.
2d 31, 34.
In that case in discussing the essentials of an acknowledgment, it is stated:
"The essentials of a sufficient acknowledgment have been frequently stated and were
well expressed in Southern Pacific Co. v.
Prosser. 898, 122 Cal. App. 413 at page
415, 52 P. 836, 837, 55 P 145 as follows:
-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'The distinct and unqualified admission of
an existing debt., contained in a writing.,
signed by the party to be charged., and without intimation of an intent to refuse payment
thereof, suffices to establish the debt to
which the contract relates as a continuing
contract and to interrupt the running of the
Statute of Limitations against the same.
From such an acknowledgment the law
implies a promise to pay. 1 ''
---'Applying the rule it will be seen that
the defendant's letter definitely and unqualifiedly admits the debt and that there is
no intimation in it of an intent to refuse
payment. Therefore., the effect of the correspondence was to waive so much of the
period of limitations as had theretofore run
in favor of the defendants. From the date
of the letter it becomes manifest that the
action was brought in time." Vassere v.
Jorger, 10 Cal. 2d 689., 692, 76 P. 2d 656;
Southern Pacific Company v. Prosser,
Supra.''
In the instant case we have an agreement
signed by Emmett D. Ford on the 18th day of April.,
1950, which is much stronger than a mere letter

acknowledging the debt as existed in the above California case.

This agreement together with payments
-8-
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r

'

made during 1950 and 1951 in the amount of at least
$450.00 appear to be sufficient to invoke the rule of

the above case which is in the California jurisdiction
and which jurisdiction has a statute similar to that of
ours in Utah.
A similar finding was reached by the IVIonr

tana Court in the case of Dodge v. Simon (1942) 1 113
Montana 536 1 129 P. 2d 224. It was recognized by
the Court that the Statute of Limitations upon a decree
quieting title to real estate, having the effect of a
judgment, was tolled by an acknowledgment of the
existence of the judgment unsatisfied made in open
court, the court stating., with reference to its application of the majority rule respecting the tolling of
a statute upon judgment for the recovery of money.,
that it could see no reason why the rule should not
be applied to judgment for recovery of possession of
real property, as well.
-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Quoting from the court directly:
"While there is divergency of views of the
question, the cases holding that a statute
limiting the time of effectiveness of a judgment may be tolled by acknowledgment of
a judgment seem to establish the majority
rule, and which we follow. While the cases
cited in the annotations above referred to
deal with judgments for the recovery of
money, we can see no reason why the rule
should not be applied to judgment for recovery
of possession of real property. 11 (emphasis
added)
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
SECTION 78-12-44 UCA EXTENDED THE PERIOD
DURING WHICH A NEW ACTION COULD BE FILED ON
THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT.

Section 78-12-44, U.C.A ... 1953, represents
a statute which the appellant alleges was either not
considered or was misconstrued.
"Section 78-12-44. In any case founded
on contract, when any part of the principal
or interest shall have been paid or an
acknowledgment of an existing liability
debt or claim, or any promise to pay the
same shall have been made, an action may
be brought within the period prescribed for
the same after such payment acknowledgment or promise; but such acknowledgment
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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or prom-i se must be in writing signed by the
party to .b e charged thereby. When a right
of action is barred by the provision of any
: statut~, it shall be unavailable either as a
cause of action or ground of defense."
..Appellant submits that the crucial wording of
the statute as it relates to -this case are the first six

words., "In any case founded on contract." {emphasis
added) A forced and strained interpretation is certainly
necessary to arrive -a t the conclusion that these words
do not include a definite contract in the form of promissory notes which were reduced to judgment. The better
reasoning leads one to the easily managable and satisfy-

ing determination oi the Iowa Court, ''that where a
contract is enforced byjudgment, although it enters
into and becomes a part of the judgment, that judgment
is .not the obligation of the contract but is the authorized
power under which those antecedent obligations are to be

enforced." Spratt v. Reid (Iowa) 3 G. Greene 489 - 56
Am Dec. 549
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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A simple reading of the above statute is

sufficient to see that judgments per se are not
excluded.
But if it be construed that Section 78-12-44
is limited strictly to contracts in their basic form.,
still many of our courts hold that a judgment can
properly be called a contract.

30 A Am Jur., Sec 5,

p. 161.

uThe decisions are not in accord as to the
statutes of a judgment as a contract. If a judgment
can properly be considered a contract it is only in
a recondite and remote sense of the term or in the
ordinary sense of an agreement reached between
persons to the terms of which their mutual assent
has been given because usually the defendant has not
volunarily assented. However., there are cases in
which a judgment is called a contract or a contract
of record., or a contract of the highest nature, or a
specialty.
-12 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Occasionally it has been said that a judgment
is in the nature .of a contract or that the liability under

a judgment is contractual in nature. Since a promise

to pay. a judgment is implied in law it is sometime
regarded as raising an implied contract.
Thus it ·appears that in some senses and for
s.ome purposes a judgment is treated and considered as
a contract. -This is particularly true with reference

to actions and remedies on contracts including the remedy of attachment or garnishment. I'

CONCLUSION
Appellant bases its arguments on the two
theories set out above.

First that the common law

allowed the tolling of the Statute of Limitations on obligations by part payment or acknowledgment or by both.
That there exists no specific statutory exclusion of
judgments and that the law of the State of Utah would
follow the majority of courts in the United States by

-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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including judgments in the doctrine.

That the

respondent by signing an acknowledgment and paying
$450.00 it acknowledged the original agreement and

thereby waived whatever part of the Statute of Limitations that had run.
Second~

a specified statute 78-12-44., UCA

1953., extends the time during which an action may be

brought on any case founded on contract. Appellant
alleges that promissory notes reduced to judgment
are ''founded on contract'' (emphasis added)
Respectfully submitted,

RICHARDS., BIRD AND HART
and CLARENCE J. FROST
Attorneys for Appellant
716 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City., Utah
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